On 1 February 1958, Egypt and Syria united to form the United Arab Republic. Two weeks later, Iraq and Jordan joined forces to create the Arab Union. These unions intensified Israel's feeling of isolation and siege, especially since the union of Iraq and Jordan brought Iraq, which had refused to sign an armistice agreement with Israel, closer to the latter's borders. Under these circumstances, Israel's diplomatic efforts during that period were chiefly focused on two objectives: attempts --- which proved unsuccessful -- to obtain guarantees for its security from the Western powers; and attempts, which were partially successful, to secure additional sources of arms. Another unsuccessful attempt was to create a tie with NATO.

The military coup in Baghdad on 14 July 1958, which overthrew the pro-Western Hashemite regime, aroused concern for the fate of Lebanon and Jordan, which turned to the United States and Britain for assistance. The latter complied, and asked Israel for permission for their aircraft to fly through Israel's airspace in order to come to Jordan's aid. Israel agreed, thus proving itself to be a reliable ally of the West. On 1 August, the Soviet Union submitted to Israel a note of protest regarding these flights, and Israel asked the United States and Britain to discontinue them. This step caused a bitter exchange with the United States which eventually brought Israel important gains: during the discussions, important covert messages were sent to Israel, such as the assurance that in case of a Soviet attack on Israel, the United States would come to its rescue. In addition, the United States sold Israel 100 recoilless guns. Britain also approved some of Israel's requests for arms purchases. But because of considerations involving their ties with the Arab states, the United States and Britain refrained from giving Israel any public assurances for its safety.

Another by-product of the crisis in the Middle East following the coup in Iraq was the improved ties between Israel and Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia, all of which shared Israel's view of Nasser as an enemy. These ties, which were more covert than overt, brought considerable benefits to Israel.

The volume contains 536 documents plus appendixes.